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I. JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to determine this 
appeal due to the failure of defendants/appellants Paul K. Jun and 
Ester Young Ja Jun (hereafter defendants) to file a timely notice 
of appeal. Had defendants timely filed their notice of appeal, the 
court would have proper appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does this court lack jurisdiction to determine this appeal 
due to defendants' failure to file a timely notice of appeal? 
2. If jurisdiction is proper, did the district court abuse 
its discretion by denying defendants' request to defer their 
payment of an amount imposed by the court as a condition to 
granting defendants relief from the judgment previously entered 
against them? The standard of review is whether the district 
court's ruling has no reasonable basis, Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) or was so unreasonable that it 
can be classified as arbitrary and capricious, Kunzler v. O'Dell, 
855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff/appellee Ka Ae Park (hereafter 
plaintiff) to collect an obligation owing from defendants. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Following defendants' failure to answer plaintiff's 
interrogatories, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to 
compel and required defendants to answer the interrogatories within 
ten days and to pay plaintiff $250 plus her attorney's fees 
incurred in bringing the motion. Following defendants' failure to 
answer the interrogatories and to pay the sanction imposed by the 
district court, the court granted appellee's motion for sanctions, 
struck defendants' answer, dismissed their counterclaim, and 
entered judgment against them as prayed for in appellee's 
complaint. Defendants filed a motion for relief from the judgment, 
and that motion was denied by the district court. Defendants filed 
a second motion for relief from the judgment which the district 
court granted, provided that defendants comply fully with two 
conditions no later than December 15, 1993. Defendants complied 
with one of the two conditions but failed to comply with the 
second. By the terms of the district court's order, defendants' 
failure to comply fully with both conditions by December 15, 1993 
meant that their "second motion for relief from judgment or order 
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interrogatories, despite a stipulated extension of time to answer. 
R., at pps. 4 4 - 4 8 . 
6. May 24, 1993 — The district court entered an order 
requiring defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories within 
10 days and to pay the sum of $250 plus any fees incurred by 
plaintiff in bringing her motion. R. , at pps. 53 - 54. Defendants 
never opposed plaintiff's motion to compel and never claimed that 
the court's imposition of the financial sanction was improper due 
to their impecuniosity. 
7. June 10, 1993 — Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions 
due to defendants' failure to comply with the court order requiring 
them to answer plaintiff's interrogatories within 10 days. In her 
motion for sanctions, plaintiff requested the court to strike 
defendants' answer and to render default judgment or to impose such 
other sanctions as may be appropriate. R., at pps. 60 - 62. 
8. July 15, 1993 — By minute entry, Judge Moffat imposed 
sanctions for defendants' failure to comply with the court's 
previous order. The court entered defendants' default and 
indicated that the counterclaim should be dismissed and judgment 
granted pursuant to the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. The court 
further awarded attorney's fees and an additional sum of $500 as a 
sanction against defendants. R. , at pps. 65 - 66. Defendants 
never opposed plaintiff's motion for sanctions and never claimed 
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Defendants never argued that imposition of the financial sanctions 
was improper due to their impecuniosity. 
13. November 15, 1993 — The district court entered an order 
with respect to defendants' second motion for relief from judgment 
or order that provided in part as follows: 
Provided defendants comply fully with the conditions set 
forth below no later than December 15, 1993, their second 
motion for relief from judgment or order dated July 26, 
1993 shall be granted and defendants shall be granted 
relief from the judgment previously entered herein on 
August 9, 1993. 
The two conditions the court imposed were that defendants provide 
full and complete answers to the outstanding interrogatories and 
that they pay plaintiff the sum of $1,335 in attorney's fees and 
sanctions. The order further stated as follows: 
If defendants have not fully complied with both 
conditions set forth above by December 15, 1993, 
defendants' second motion for relief from judgment or 
order shall, without further notice or hearing, be deemed 
denied and the judgment previously entered shall stand 
and remain in full force and effect, and no further 
motion for relief from the judgment and order shall be 
considered by the court. 
R., at pps. 138 - 140. 
14. December 15, 1993 — Defendants submitted their answers 
to the outstanding interrogatories but failed to pay any of the 
$1,335 the court had ordered them to pay as a condition to 
obtaining relief from the default judgment. Defendants filed a 
"Motion to Defer Payment of Sanctions" and an unsigned affidavit of 
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defendant Paul K. Jun and argued for the first time that "through 
no fault of their own, [defendants] exhausted their capital and are 
unable to pay the sanction amount." R., at pps. 141 - 152. 
15. By minute entry, Judge Moffat ruled on defendants' motion 
to defer payment of sanctions. The minute entry stated in part as 
follows: 
The motion is denied. The court is of the opinion that 
the allegations of reasons for failure to satisfy the 
sanctions which were imposed are not sufficient. In 
addition the court notes that this case has been one 
continual delay after another on behalf of the defendants 
and the court has little faith in the credibility of the 
allegations of the defendants. It should be further 
noted that the affidavit of Paul K. Jun as filed with the 
court is neither signed nor notarized and therefore is 
legally not sufficient and cannot be considered. 
R., at pps. 166 - 168. 
16. February 8, 1994 — The district court entered an order 
denying defendants7 motion to defer payment of sanctions. R., at 
pps. 170 - 171. 
17. March 10, 1994 — Defendants filed an ex parte motion to 
extend the time to file their notice of appeal. R., at p. 172. 
18. April 11, 1994 — Defendants filed their notice of 
appeal. R., at pps. 174 - 175. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendants failed to file a timely notice of appeal, and 
this court lacks jurisdiction to determine the appeal. 
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2. Defendants may not raise an equal protection argument for 
the first time on appeal. 
3. This court should not consider the conclusory arguments of 
defendants involving pivotal issues made without citation to any 
cases of any significance. 
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 




THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
SINCE DEFENDANTS7 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED 
Defendants failed to file a timely notice of appeal of any 
final, appealable order. This court lacks jurisdiction and should 
dismiss this appeal. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that an 
appeal may be taken "from all final orders and judgments" of the 
district court by filing a notice of appeal "within the time 
allowed by Rule 4." Rule 4 requires the notice of appeal to be 
filed "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from." 
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Following entry of the judgment against them on August 9, 
1993, defendants filed two post-judgment motions for relief under 
Rule 60(b). An order denying relief under Rule 60(b) is a final 
appealable order. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). Under Rules 3 and 4, defendants had 30 
days after the denial of their second motion for relief to file 
their notice of appeal. 
Pursuant to the terms of the district court/s November 15, 
1993 order, defendants7 second motion for relief was deemed denied 
on December 15, 1993 when defendants failed to comply fully with 
the two conditions imposed by the court for granting relief from 
the judgment. The order stated as follows: 
Provided defendants comply fully with the conditions set 
forth below no later than December 15, 1993, their second 
motion for relief from judgment or order dated July 26, 
1993 shall be granted.... 
If defendants have not fully complied with both 
conditions set forth above by December 15, 1993, 
defendants7 second motion for relief from judgment or 
order shall, without further notice or hearing, be deemed 
denied and the judgment previously entered shall stand 
and remain in full force and effect, and no further 
motion for relief from the judgment and order shall be 
considered by the court. 
R., at pps. 138 - 140. 
Defendants did not file their notice of appeal until April 11, 
1994, long after the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal 
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had elapsed.1 Defendants having failed to file a timely notice of 
appeal with respect to the order denying their second Rule 60(b) 
motion for relief, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
of that order. 
Defendants claim that the order they are appealing is the 
order of February 8, 1994 denying their motion to defer payment of 
sanctions and that their notice of appeal was, therefore, timely 
filed. That order is not, however, a final, appealable order. The 
rights of the parties had already been fully resolved by the denial 
of defendants7 second motion for relief from judgment. Their 
motion to defer the payment of sanctions and the order denying that 
motion were merely tangential to the essential issues between the 
parties. The order denying defendants7 motion to defer payment of 
sanctions has none of the indicia of a final, appealable order. 
See generally 47 Am Jur. 2d, Judgments, §1053. See also Hase v. 
Hase, 775 P. 2d 943 (Utah App. 1989) where the court held that an 
order that "wholly disposed of all remaining claims between the 
parties" constituted the final order from which an appeal could be 
taken and that a later consolidated decree and order merely 
HJnder Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as 
late as February 14, 1994 defendants could have also requested the 
trial court for an extension of time to file their notice of 
appeal. They did not file their ex parte motion for an extension 
until March 10, 1994. The late motion and the trial court7s order 
pursuant to that late motion should be ignored in determining 
whether defendants filed a timely notice of appeal. 
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reiterating what the court had previously ordered could not be used 
to extend the time for appeal. Id., at p. 945.2 
Defendants did not file a timely notice of appeal of any 
final, appealable order or judgment. This court lacks jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal and should dismiss it. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
DEFENDANTS' EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Defendants7 brief contains an argument based on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This argument 
was not presented in the district court and should be disregarded 
by this court. 
At no point in the district court proceedings did defendants 
ever raise an argument based on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution. It is axiomatic that an issue not 
raised in the trial court will not be addressed by the appeallate 
court. E.g., Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 
1086 (Utah App. 1991) (Stating that the reviewing court will not 
address an issue raised for the first time on appeal.) 
2Likewise, defendants' motion to defer payment of sanctions is 
not one of the motions enumerated in Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure which extend the time for filing the notice of 
appeal until after the denial of such a motion. 
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Defendants failed to present any argument to the district 
court regarding the Equal Protection Clause. Their argument on 
that issue, raised for the first time on appeal, should be 
disregarded. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
DEFENDANTS7 CONCLUSORY ARGUMENTS 
MADE WITH VIRTUALLY NO CITATION 
TO ANY CASES OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE 
Like their arguments presented to the trial court in support 
of their motion to defer payment of sanctions, defendants in their 
brief present only conclusory arguments not supported by any cases 
of any significance. Their argument should be disregarded and 
their appeal dismissed. 
Defendants have attempted to raise serious issues regarding 
due process and equal protection and their application to allegedly 
impecunious parties allegedly unable to pay sanctions imposed by 
the court. Defendants7 argument, however, is merely conclusory in 
nature and totally devoid of any meaningful citation to relevant 
cases, leaving both opposing counsel and this court to speculate as 
to the basis and legal authority of their claims. 
This court has stated that it will not consider conclusory 
arguments on pivotal issues made by parties to an appeal without 
citation to either the record or applicable case law. Marchant v. 
Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1991). Defendants7 argument in 
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this case presents such a situation, and this court should not 
consider the conclusory argument set forth by defendants in their 
brief. The court should dismiss the appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS7 MOTION 
TO DEFER PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS 
As set forth under Point I above, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Even if the court has 
jurisdiction, however, it should affirm the district court's order 
denying defendants' motion to defer payment of sanctions as a 
proper exercise of the district court's discretion. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when there is "no reasonable 
basis for the [district court's] decision", Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) or where the 
court's ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious", Kunzler v. Q'Dellf 855 P. 2d 270, 275 
(Utah App. 1993) . 
The facts of this case plainly demonstrate that the trial 
court had ample reason to deny defendants' request to defer paying 
the sanctions previously imposed by the court and did not abuse its 
discretion. Defendants had a long history of, as the district 
court put it, "playing games" (R. , at p. 88) and ignoring their 
obligation to respond appropriately to discovery requests and court 
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orders. By the time it ruled on defendants7 motion to defer 
payment of sanctions, the court was well justified in its 
conclusion that it had "little faith in the credibility of the 
allegations of the defendants." R. , at p. 166. 
Even if the defendants' allegations of impecuniosity were 
believable and legitimate, impecuniosity alone should not be a 
sufficient basis for relieving recalcitrant and neglectful parties 
from proper sanctions imposed by the court for the parties' failure 
to respond to prior court orders. Even impecunious litigants who 
file an affidavit of impecuniosity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 21-
7-3 are not relieved of all financial burdens with respect to 
litigation. E.g., Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643 (Utah 1993) 
(The fees and costs excused by the filing of an affidavit of 
impecuniosity do not include the costs of preparing transcripts.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendants' motion to defer payment of sanctions. The court should 
affirm the district court's denial of that motion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff/appellee Ka Ae Park 
respectfully requests this court to dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, if jurisdiction is proper, to 
14 
affirm the district court's denial of defendants' motion to defer 
payment of sanctions. 
Dated this ^ ° - day of December, 1994. 
ROBERT H. REES, P.C. 
Ttobe^t H. Rees 
Attorney for p l a in t i f f / appe l l ee 
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